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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20080701-CA 
GREG C. JOHNSON, and KERRY E. LYNN, : 
Defendants / Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendants had been convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy Deer 
Without a Valid License, a third-degree felony, on April 22,2002. R. 27-30, 159-62. On 
July 30, 2007, defendants asked the district court in their criminal cases to order the 
Division of Wildlife Resources to reinstate the defendants' hunting privileges. R. 51-64, 
177-90. The district court denied these motions on July 17, 2008. R. 126-29, 267-72. 
Defendants filed their notices of appeal on August 14, 2008. R. 130-31, 271-72. This 
Court consolidated these two actions on September 17, 2008. R. 132, 273. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because the defendants failed 
to exhaust their available administrative remedies. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any 
time. Hous. Auth. of the County of Salt Lake v. Snvder. 2002 UT 28,111, 44 P.3d 724. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be 
to determine whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is 
outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-
Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in interpreting its own 
order as creating a separate judicial suspension of the defendants' hunting privileges and 
not as a modification of the preexisting administrative suspension. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised below and was the basis 
for the district court's decision. R. 69-75,195-200,126-29,267-70. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A court's interpretation of its own order is 
reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great deference." 
Uintah Basin Med. Or. v. Hardy. 2008 UT 15, f 9, 179 P.3d 786. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants Johnson and Lynn were convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy 
Deer Without a Valid License on April 22, 2002, a third degree felony. R. 27-30, 159-62. 
Neither the original judgments nor the amended judgments (R. 31-37, 163-168) mention 
anything concerning a suspension of the defendants' hunting license or permit privileges. 
Defendant Johnson had his big game hunting license and permit privileges 
administratively suspended for fourteen years on August 28, 2002 by the Division of 
Wildlife Resources. R. 91-93. He did not appeal this decision. Defendant Lynn had his 
big game hunting license and permit privileges administratively suspended for twenty-one 
years on August 29, 2002 by the Division of Wildlife Resources. R. 217-19. He did not 
appeal this decision. 
On December 29, 2004, both defendants filed motions asking that their convictions 
be reduced from Third Degree Felonies to Class A Misdemeanors and that their hunting 
privileges be suspended for five years from the date of their convictions. R. 38-39, 169-
70. These motions were granted by the district court. R. 49-50,. 275-76. 
On July 30, 2007, the defendants asked the district court to order the Division of 
Wildlife Resources to reinstate the defendants' hunting privileges. R. 51-64, 177-90. 
The district court denied these motions on July 17, 2008. R. 126-29, 267-72. Defendants 
filed their notices of appeal on August 14, 2008. R. 130-31, 271-72. This Court 
consolidated these two actions on September 17, 2008. R. 132 273 
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This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendants Johnson and Lynn were convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy 
Deer Without a Valid License on April 22, 2002, a third degree felony. R. 27-30, 159-62. 
The original judgments provide that "[u]pon the successful completion of 24 months of 
probation, the defendant may file a 402B motion to have the felony reduced to a Class A 
misdemeanor and the State will not oppose the motion." R. 33, 161. No mention is made 
in the judgment, or the amended judgments (R. 31-37, 163-168) concerning any 
suspension of the defendants' hunting license or permit privileges. 
On July 8, 2002, notices of agency action were mailed to the defendants informing 
them that the Division of Wildlife Resources was commencing adjudicative proceedings 
to consider suspending the defendants' "privileges to harvest protected wildlife in the 
State of Utah." R. 84-88, 210-14. Neither defendant responded to the notices of agency 
action that they received. Both failed to participate in the administrative adjudicative 
proceedings. This led to default orders being entered suspending the defendants big game 
hunting license and permit privileges. R. 91-93, 217-19. Defendant Johnson's privileges 
were suspended for fourteen years on August 28, 2002. R. 91-93. Defendant Lynn's 
were suspended years on August 29, 2002. R. 217-19. Neither of the defendants 
appealed these decisions. 
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On December 29, 2004, both defendants filed motions asking that their convictions 
be reduced from third degree felonies to class A misdemeanors and that their hunting 
privileges be suspended for five years from the date of their convictions. R. 38-39, 169-
70. These motions were granted by the district court. R. 49-50, 275-76. The court's 
orders do not mention the administrative suspensions. They simply state that 
"Defendant's hunting privileges are suspended until April 22, 2007 which is five years 
from the date of conviction." R. 49, 275. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants asked the district court, in their criminal actions, to modify the 
Division of Wildlife Resources' administrative suspension of their hunting privileges and 
reinstate those privileges contrary to the administrative orders. The defendants did not 
exhaust their administrative remedies. Instead they failed to even participate in the 
administrative adjudicative proceedings and did not appeal the same. They did not 
exhaust their available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. This 
Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the defendants 
have failed to satisfy the precondition of exhausting their available administrative 
remedies. 
The defendants seek to read into the district court's orders a modification of the 
administrative suspensions that is not there. The district court did not clearly abuse its 
discretion in reading its own decisions as creating a separate judicial suspension and as 
not ordering any action on the part of the Division. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR AVAILABLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
Defendants sought judicial review of the Division of Wildlife Resources 
administrative decisions in their criminal actions. They claim that it was part of their plea 
bargains that they would only have their hunting privileges suspended for five years. R. 
54, 180. Their criminal judgments, originally and as amended, are silent on this point. 
Assuming the correctness of the defendants' allegation, they were aware at the time they 
received the notices of agency action and the default orders that the administrative 
suspensions were contrary to their claim that they were to serve only a five-year 
suspension. But the defendants did not participate in the administrative proceedings. 
They did not exhaust their available administrative remedies. 
"As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a 
prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 
74, ^|14, 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotations omitted). "Where this precondition to suit is not 
satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction." Hous. Auth. of the County of Salt Lake 
v. Snvder, 2002 UT 28, ^11, 44 P.3d 724. Before seeking judicial review of the 
Division's administrative orders the defendants were required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies. Their failure to do so means that this Court is without subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
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The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies does not apply only to direct 
judicial review of administrative decisions. Snyder involved an unlawful detainer action. 
Federal law required that the housing authority provide an administrative grievance 
hearing before it could seek to evict a tenant. Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at ^13. Because the 
authority had failed to make an administrative hearing available to Snyder, the Supreme 
Court held that the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the separate 
unlawful detainer action. 
Housing Authority therefore failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 
and had no right to seek relief from the district court. As a result, the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Housing Authority's 
unlawful detainer action. 
Id at 1J22 (citation omitted). 
Nor do any of the exceptions to the exhaustion remedy apply. 
As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative 
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. Exceptions to this 
rule exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a 
likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would 
be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears 
that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. There is no question but 
that the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act, but HTC has 
not convinced us that appealing the city's rejection of its application in the 
manner required by state statute and city ordinance would have been futile. 
Holladav Towne Ctr. v. Holladav City. 2008 UT App 301,1(6, 192 P.3d 302 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). In rejecting a claim of unusual circumstances, this 
Court held that political considerations that might impact Holladay City's decisions in the 
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administrative proceedings did not meet the unusual circumstances exception. Holladay 
City. 2008 UTApp 301 at H7. 
Defendants could have raised in the administrative adjudicative proceedings their 
claim that they were to serve only a five year suspension of their hunting privileges. 
They certainly could have challenged the decisions of the Division on administrative 
review as being contrary to their interpretation of the criminal court's decision. It would 
not have been a futile or vain gesture to make this argument in the administrative 
proceeding. But the defendants' failure to participate in the administrative hearings is 
unexcused. They chose not to exhaust their available administrative remedies. Their 
actions prevent this Court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal. 
This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendants' 
appeal. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN INTERPRETING ITS OWN ORDERS 
Defendants asked the district court to interpret its criminal judgments and orders as 
modifying and revoking the administrative suspensions of the defendants hunting 
privileges. The district court declined to do so, finding that its orders had not been 
directed at the Division of Wildlife Resources and did not impact the administrative 
suspensions. The district court's decisions are not a clear abuse of its discretion and 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
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ffA court's interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion 
and we afford the district court great deference." Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008 
UT 15,1)9, 179 P.3d 786. The trial court is the best interpreter of its own orders. In Re 
Consol. Indus. Corp., 360 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2004) (bankruptcy court's interpretation 
of its own prior orders would not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion); United 
States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying this general rule to 
orders in criminal proceedings). 
Defendants have failed to show that Judge Lee's decision was a clear abuse of 
discretion. At best, defendants seek to show that the district court's prior orders could be 
interpreted in a different manner. This does not show a clear abuse of discretion. 
In response to the defendants' motions, the district court reduced their convictions 
from felonies to misdemeanors. It also suspended their hunting privileges "until April 22, 
2007 which is five years from the date of conviction." R. 49, 275. Nothing in the 
original criminal judgments, or as amended, mentions anything about a suspension of 
their hunting privileges. Nothing in the Orders Granting 402 Motion mentions the 
Division of Wildlife Resources or the administrative suspensions the defendants were 
serving. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to interpret these orders as 
creating a separate judicial suspension. Such a suspension is permitted under the 
applicable statutes. 
Utah law authorizes a court to suspend hunting privileges as part of criminal 
sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(9)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The court also has the 
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option of only recommending that the Division of Wildlife Resources take action to 
suspend hunting privileges. Id,, § 23-19-9(9)(b) & (d). But the Division is given the 
authority to suspend hunting privileges as well. IdL, § 23-19-9(1) through (8). 
The Division's hearing officer must suspend a person's hunting privileges if he has 
been found guilty, enters a plea in abeyance, pleads guilty or no contest to one of the 
listed wildlife related violations. IdL, § 23-19-9(2). In other circumstances the hearing 
officer has discretion as to whether or not a person's hunting privileges should be 
suspended. ]cL § 23-19-9(7). The length of the defendants' administrative suspensions is 
expressly provided by statute, as well as the requirement that the suspension be doubled if 
certain aggravating circumstances are found.1 Id. § 23-19(4) and (5). 
The primary goal of courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. State v. Burns, 2000 
UT 56, ^ 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some 
ambiguity."). "A principal rule of statutory construction is that the terms of a statute 
should not be interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole" Ajax Magnesium Corp. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). 
"We read the plain language of a statute . . . as a whole and interpret its 
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute." "We do 
so because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is 
animated by one general purpose and intent." 
1
 Johnson's suspension was increased because of his unlawful taking of a trophy 
animal. R. 92. Lynn's suspension was increased because of his unlawful taking of a 
trophy animal while he was still serving a prior suspension. R. 218. 
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State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81,1[12, 171 P.3d 426 (citations omitted). 
The statute clearly creates two separate types of suspensions, one judicial and the 
other administrative in nature. The plain language of the statute mandates an 
administrative suspension be imposed if a person is convicted of certain crimes, as were 
the defendants. A separate judicial suspension is also authorized. Nothing in the statute 
prohibits both a judicial and administrative suspension be imposed for the same 
conviction. The statute only prohibits more than one administrative suspension "for each 
single criminal episode." Section 23-19-9(6)(a). The district court did not clearly abuse 
its discretion in interpreting its own orders pursuant to their plain language. The 402 
orders created judicial suspensions and did not address the separate administrative 
suspensions. 
Indeed, the statute provides that an administrative suspension can run 
consecutively to a judicial suspension. Id, § 23-19-9(6)(c). While consecutive 
suspensions are permitted, it was not done in these cases. The judicial suspensions ran 
until April 33, 2007. R. 49-50, 275-76. The administrative suspensions run until August 
19, 2016 for Johnson, R. 91, and August 19, 2023 for Lynn, R. 217. The trial court was 
within its discretion when it interpreted its prior orders as creating a separate suspension 
and not being directed at the Division's suspensions: 
The defendant cites Utah Code Annotated 23-19-9.1 in support of his 
argument. That section reads as follows: "[fjhe division shall promptly 
withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use of a license issued under this 
chapter if so ordered by a court." 
11 
The Court finds the 25, January 2005 Order of this Court did not 
direct the Division to do anything. Thus, Section 23-19-9.1 does not apply 
in this case. 
Further, the Court finds if there is a court order suspending hunting 
privileges and a similar administrative order entered by the Division, these 
orders may run consecutively. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 23-19-
9(6)(c). 
The Court concludes there is no basis in this case to require the 
Division to change its administrative order concerning suspension of the 
defendant's hunting privileges. 
R. 127-28, 268-69. 
The entirety of the defendants' argument is based on their presumption that the 
district court's orders granting 402 motions (R. 49-50, 275-76) did not actually create a 
judicial suspension of the defendants' hunting privileges pursuant to the actual words 
used. Instead, the defendants argue that the orders were intended to modify the 
administrative suspensions, though the Division and its administrative suspensions are not 
mentioned. Brief of Appellants at 29. 
The district court refused to read into its orders this extra provision. The Orders 
Granting 402 Motion state that they are suspending the defendants' hunting privileges for 
five years from the date of their convictions. The district court interpreted these orders in 
accord with the plain meaning of the language used. Nothing in the orders states an intent 
to modify or in any way alter the existing administrative suspensions. Instead the orders 
simply establish a separate judicial five-year suspension of the defendants5 hunting 
privileges. 
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The same is true of the criminal judgments. R. 27-37, 159-68. No mention is 
made in any of the judgments of an agreement sanctioned by the Court that any 
administrative suspensions would be limited to five years. Indeed, at the time the original 
judgments were entered there was, as of yet, no administrative suspension to modify. The 
judgments did not suspend the defendants hunting privileges. They do not include any 
limitation on the right of the Division to suspend the defendants hunting privileges. The 
district court followed the plain language of its decisions in ruling that it had not ordered 
the Division to alter or modify the administrative suspensions in any manner. 
The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion and its decisions should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal and should 
therefore dismiss the appeal. In the alternative, the district court did not clearly abuse its 
discretion by how it interpreted its own orders and its decision should therefore be 
affirmed. 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Plaintiff/ appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this 
matter, though the plaintiff desires to participate in oral argument if such is held by the 
Court. 
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Respectfully submitted this / day of June, 2009. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this / / day of June, 2009: 
MARY ANN HANSEN 
852 North 910 East 
Orem, Utah 84097 




Determinative Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann, § 23-19-9 (West Supp. 2008). Suspension of license or permit 
privileges — Suspension of certificates of registration. 
(1) As used in this section, "license or permit privileges" means the privilege of 
applying for, purchasing, and exercising the benefits conferred by a license or permit 
issued by the division. 
(2) A hearing officer, appointed by the division, may suspend a person's license or 
permit privileges if: 
(a) in a court of law, the person: 
(i) is convicted of: 
(A) violating this title or a rule of the Wildlife Board; 
(B) killing or injuring domestic livestock while engaged in an activity regulated under 
this title; or 
(C) violating Section 76-10-508 while engaged in an activity regulated under this title; 
(ii) enters into a plea in abeyance agreement, in which the person pleads guilty or no 
contest to an offense listed in Subsection (2)(a)(i), and the plea is held in abeyance; or 
(iii) is charged with committing an offense listed in Subsection (2)(a)(i), and the 
person enters into a diversion agreement which suspends the prosecution of the offense; 
and 
(b) the hearing officer determines the person committed the offense intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly, as defined in Section 76-2-103. 
(3) (a) The Wildlife Board shall make rules establishing guidelines that a hearing 
officer shall consider in determining: 
(i) the type of license or permit privileges to suspend; and 
(ii) the duration of the suspension. 
(b) The Wildlife Board shall ensure that the guidelines established under Subsection 
(3)(a) are consistent with Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(4) Except as provided in Subsections (5) and (6), a hearing officer may suspend a 
person's license or permit privileges according to Subsection (2) for a period of time not 
to exceed: 
(a) seven years for: 
(i) a felony conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a felony, which plea is 
held in abeyance pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement; or 
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a felony, the prosecution of which is 
suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement; 
(b) five years for: 
(i) a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
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(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a class A misdemeanor, 
which plea is held in abeyance pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement; or 
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class A misdemeanor, the 
prosecution of which is suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement; 
(c) three years for: 
(i) a class B misdemeanor conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guihy or no contest to an offense punishable as a class B misdemeanor 
when the plea is held in abeyance according to a plea in abeyance agreement; or 
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class B misdemeanor, the 
prosecution 
of which is suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement; and 
(d) one year for: 
(i) a class C misdemeanor conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a class C misdemeanor, 
when the plea is held in abeyance according to a plea in abeyance agreement; or 
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class C misdemeanor, the 
prosecution of which is suspended according to a diversion agreement. 
(5) The hearing officer may double a suspension period established in Subsection (4) 
for offenses: 
(a) committed in violation of an existing suspension or revocation order issued by the 
courts, division, or Wildlife Board; or 
(b) involving the unlawful taking of a trophy animal, as defined in Section 23-13-2. 
(6) (a) A hearing officer may suspend, according to Subsection (2), a person's license 
or permit privileges for a particular license or permit only once for each single criminal 
episode, as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(b) If a hearing officer addresses two or more single criminal episodes in a hearing, the 
suspension periods of any license or permit privileges of the same type suspended, 
according to Subsection (2), may run consecutively. 
(c) If a hearing officer suspends, according to Subsection (2), license or permit 
privileges of the type that have been previously suspended by a court, a hearing officer, or 
the Wildlife Board and the suspension period has not expired, the suspension periods may 
run consecutively. 
(7) (a) A hearing officer, appointed by the division, may suspend a person's privilege 
of applying for, purchasing, and exercising the benefits conferred by a certificate of 
registration if: 
(i) the hearing officer determines the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, as 
defined in Section 76-2-103, violated: 
(A) this title; 
(B) a rule or order of the Wildlife Board; 
(C) the terms of a certificate of registration; or 
(D) the terms of a certificate of registration application or agreement; or 
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(ii) the person, in a court of law: 
(A) is convicted of an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a reasonable 
relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the activities 
authorized by the certificate of registration; 
(B) pleads guilty or no contest to an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a 
reasonable relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the 
activities authorized by the certificate of registration, and the plea is held in abeyance in 
accordance with a plea in abeyance agreement; or 
(C) is charged with an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a reasonable 
relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the activities 
authorized by the certificate of registration, and prosecution of the offense is suspended in 
accordance with a diversion agreement. 
(b) All certificates of registration for the harvesting of brine shrimp eggs, as defined in 
Section 59-23-3, shall be suspended by a hearing officer, if the hearing officer determines 
the holder of the certificates of registration has violated Section 59-23-5. 
(8) (a) The director shall appoint a qualified person as a hearing officer to perform the 
adjudicative functions provided in this section. 
(b) The director may not appoint a division employee who investigates or enforces 
wildlife violations. 
(9) (a) The courts may suspend, in criminal sentencing, a person's privilege to apply 
for, purchase, or exercise the benefits conferred by a license, permit, or certificate of 
registration. 
(b) The courts shall promptly notify the division of any suspension orders or 
recommendations entered. 
(c) The division, upon receiving notification of suspension from the courts, shall 
prohibit the person from applying for, purchasing, or exercising the benefits conferred by 
a license, permit, or certification of registration for the duration and of the type specified 
in the court order. 
(d) The hearing officer shall consider any recommendation made by a sentencing court 
concerning suspension before issuing a suspension order. 
(10) (a) A person may not apply for, purchase, possess, or attempt to exercise the 
benefits conferred by any permit, license, or certificate of registration specified in an 
order of suspension while that order is in effect. 
(b) Any license possessed or obtained in violation of the order shall be considered 
invalid. 
(c) A person who violates Subsection (10)(a) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(11) Before suspension under this section, a person must be: 
(a) given written notice of any action the division intends to take; and 
(b) provided with an opportunity for a hearing. 
(12) (a) A person may file an appeal of a hearing officer's decision with the Wildlife 
Board. 
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(b) The Wildlife Board shall review the hearing officer's findings and conclusions and 
any written documentation submitted at the hearing. 
(c) The Wildlife Board may: 
(i) take no action; 
(ii) vacate or remand the decision; or 
(iii) amend the period or type of suspension. 
(13) The division shall suspend and reinstate all hunting, fishing, trapping, and 
falconry privileges consistent with Title 23, Chapter 25, Wildlife Violator Compact. 
(14) The Wildlife Board may make rules to implement this section in accordance with 
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Utah Code Ann- 23-19-9.1 (West 2004). Court-ordered action against a license. 
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use of a license 
issued under this chapter if so ordered by a court. 
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